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Abstract: With each passing year, defending land and water, livelihoods and 
cultures appears to become more violent. Against the alarming number of murders 
of environmental activists or environmental defenders, which is the easiest way to 
recognize violence, this article aims to analyse other visible and invisible ways in 
which violence is manifested. Using a multidimensional approach and referring to 
case studies from the EJAtlas and other sources, it looks at the multiple 
manifestations of violence. It concludes that a south-south collaboration in 
academic-activist coproduced research on environmental justice movements would 
shed light on realities which often escape mainstream ecological economics and 
political ecology.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On 8 November 2018, anti-coal activist Agnes Kharshiing and Anita 
Sangma were assaulted with stones and sticks, allegedly by coal mafia, under 
broad daylight when their car was blocked by a mob of 30-40 people, while 
returning to Shillong after a meeting with police officials in the coal town of 
Lad Rymbai in the East Jaintia Hills region of Meghalaya (EJAtlas 2018a; 
Saikia 2018).  
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This incident is, in no way, an isolated case. According to Global Witness 
(2016), India has the highest number of murdered land and environmental 
defenders in South Asia, and the second highest after the Philippines in 
Asia. Every year, the act of defending nature and natural resources, which 
are often homes of the defenders, is increasingly becoming more violent, 
with reported murders of 197 defenders in 2017 across the globe (Watts 
2018). In the EJAtlas the proportion of environmental conflict cases in 
India where environmental defenders (one or more) have been killed is 
about 12 per cent, roughly similar to the proportion in the world in general, 
larger than in Europe, lower than in Latin America.  
Although murder or physical harm is the most common manifestation of 
violence, it is not the only way in which defenders of land, water, 
livelihoods and cultures are persecuted. Death is, of course, an extreme 
form of violence; these conflicts leave in their wake very many wounded 
people, and even those who escape physical harm, they bear the cost of 
manifold loss. Such violence manifests structurally, culturally, ecologically; it 
can be swift, and it can be slow (Galtung 1969; Nixon 2011; Zalik 2004). 
There are many studies that have analysed the interplay between 
environmental conflicts, violence and power relations (Omeje 2013; Peluso 
and Watts 2001). There are also some recent attempts beyond the case-
study approach that analyzes different forms of violence in specific 
commodities, such as hydroelectric conflicts around the world (Del Bene et 
al. 2018). Navas et al. (2018) provide a multidimensional approach to 
understanding violence by looking at ecological distribution conflicts from 
Central America. This article aims to apply this framework in the Indian 
context to highlight the perverse ways in which violence manifests itself in 
environmental justice movements in the country.  
The article is structured as follows: The next section provides the 
theoretical framework and methodology of this article. Section 3 provides a 
brief history of environmental justice movement in India and analyzes 
intensity of conflicts from the EJAtlas database. This is followed by a 
discussion of only a few cases to understand the different manifestations of 
violence, based on our experiences in different environmental conflicts and 
finally, the concluding section draws comparisons from other parts of the 
global South to promote the need for more south-south collaboration in 
academic-activist co-produced research on environmental justice 
movements.   
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY  
Ecological distribution conflicts (Martinez-Alier 1995; Martinez-Alier and 
O‘Connor 1996, Martinez-Alier 2002) can be studied as struggles for 
environmental costs and benefits emerging due to inequalities in power and 
income and are embedded in the broader context of race, class and gender 
inequalities (Robbins 2004). The Environmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas), 
which was launched in March 2014, is a tool to document and catalogue 
ecological distribution conflicts around the world. The theoretical 
framework, rooted in activist knowledge and the bottom-up methodology 
of creation of the data collection form of the EJAtlas, is explained by 
Temper et al. (2015; 2018). We use data from the EJAtlas, complemented by 
our personal knowledge of some of the environmental justice movements 
through either fieldwork or secondary literature review, to discuss violence 
in each of the cases. Our definition of violence is based on the work by 
Navas et al. (2018) who suggests a multidimensional understanding of 
violence, classifying it into five categories and matching it with variables 
from the EJAtlas; the categories are direct violence, structural violence, 
cultural violence, slow violence and ecological violence. The value of such 
research lies in analytical instead of statistical generalization (Zografos and 
Martinez-Alier 2009; Gonzalez-Hidalgo et al. 2014). This research aims to 
add new perspectives to better understand not only what constitutes as 
violence in environmental justice movements, but also comparing them 
across different geographies in the global South.  
 
3. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT IN INDIA  
3.1. A Brief History 
The environmental justice movement in India has a long history. The 
Chipko Andolan of 1973 is seen as the first environmental justice 
movement of the country, although concerns for environmental protection 
can be traced back to protests against the commercialization of forests in 
the early twentieth century under the British rule (Guha 2000; Sahu 2007). 
Such early grassroots resistances with ecological undertones like the Bengal 
peasant revolt of 1859-63 against Indigo plantations are considered to have 
resemblances to the present day protests against industrial tree plantations 
in the global South (Akula 1995; Gerber 2011). Gandhi‘s freedom 
movement also rang with concerns for the ecosystem and its people (Guha 
1995; 2018). After independence, there was a heavy boost to large 
infrastructure for nation building such as multi-purpose dam projects and 
steel plants. Although this impetus on rapid industrialization couldn‘t bring 
the desired economic growth, it unwittingly ushered in a wave of 
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environmental justice movements in the country, such as the Narmada 
Bachao Andolan or the Appiko movement or the Silent Valley protest. The 
protests over the Bhopal accident of 1984 have lasted until today. Since 
1991, after the liberalization of the Indian economy, 283 cases of ecological 
conflicts have been reported in the EJAtlas as of 24 December 2018. These 
cases account for more than one-tenth of all the environmental justice 
movements documented worldwide in the EJAtlas. Although this article 
draws from the EJAtlas, we are aware of other outstanding repositories of 
documented environmental conflicts and movements in India such as the 
Green Files, India Environmental Portal and Land Conflicts Watch (Bisht 
and Gerber 2017). 
In the last 45 years, the hows and whys of environmental justice struggles in 
India have been reshaped in many ways.  Yet, the basic premise of non-
violent direct action, which follows from the Gandhian principle of 
Satyagraha, remains. It takes unique forms depending on the context, be it 
the Koyla Satyagraha (EJAtlas 2016) against coal mining in tribal areas of 
central India or Zameen Samadhi Satyagraha (EJAtlas 2017a) against land 
acquisition in Rajasthan. These mostly peaceful manifestations are 
sometimes met with direct violence, as evidenced by the number of cases 
with high intensity of conflicts, discussed in the next sub-section. In section 
3.3. we then turn towards other ways in which violence is exerted.  
3.2. Intensity of Conflicts 
In the EJAtlas database,1 each case can be categorized as a conflict with 
unknown, latent, low, medium or high intensity. Latent conflicts are those 
that are still brewing and have no visible organization. The low-intensity 
cases have some local organization while the medium ones have more 
visible mobilizations such as street protests, rallies etc. The high-intensity 
cases include more widespread mass mobilization, often including violence. 
Unknown intensity cases are the ones without sufficient information. 
In India, more than 85% of the cases are either high (46%) or medium 
(40.4%) intensity cases. The low and latent intensity cases together 
constitute 12.1% with 1.5% of the cases remaining unknown in terms of 
their intensities2. A total number of 125 high-intensity cases have four 
categories: water management (28), fossil fuels and climate change (26), 
industrial and utilities conflicts (20) and mineral ores and building extraction 
(18), together constituting about three-fourth (92) of all the high-intensity 
cases. There are 24 cases of low mobilizations, which entail some local 
                                                          
1 This sub-section has been abstracted from Roy (2018). 
2 These figures are based on the cases registered in the EJAtlas till April, 2018. 
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organization, and 110 cases of medium-intensity conflicts which entail 
visible mobilizations through demonstrations, sit-ins etc. This is different 
from the global picture, which has cases of medium intensity as the most 
frequently occurring one (43.3%). Figure 1 illustrates the percentages of 
intensity of conflicts for world and India.   
High-intensity cases in India are the most frequent and they often have 
either the occurrence or the anticipation of large-scale displacement of 
people either for water management, which often involves the destruction 
of huge areas of forest land, or for opencast coal mining.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. MANIFESTATIONS OF VIOLENCE 
We now turn towards in-depth analysis of a few cases from the EJAtlas, 
covering different categories and geographies within India to understand 
the multiple ways in which violence in manifested.  
4.1. Direct Violence 
The case of direct violence is perhaps the easiest to pinpoint. It refers to 
threats of bodily damage, physical intimidation and harm, and death as the 
most extreme case of direct violence. The category of high-intensity 
conflicts, which covers close to half the conflicts listed from India, points 
to all of this. However, as remarked above, the number of conflicts leading 
to deaths are only about 12%. In many of these conflicts, there are multiple 
simultaneous deaths, since the defenders are often killed during 
confrontations at protest marches or rallies.  
Figure 1: Percentages of Intensity of Conflict for World and India (in the EJAtlas) 
 
Source: Roy 2018 
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One such case is that of the Kashipur bauxite mining conflict (EJAtlas 
2017b). After the economic liberalization of 1991, much thrust was 
provided for the ‗development‘ of the ‗backward states‘, which comprised 
large forest covers with high concentration of minerals underneath and 
tribal populations inhabiting those forests. In this context, in March 1993, 
the new National Mineral Policy was announced opening the mining sector 
to private investments. 
In the same year, the Utkal Aluminium Industrial Limited (UAIL) was 
formed as a consortium, originally as a joint venture between ALCAN, 
Canada; Hindalco of Birla Group, India; Tata, India and Norsk Hydro, 
Norway with the motive to mine bauxite from the Baphlimali Hills of 
Kashipur Block in Rayagada district in Odisha and construct an alumina 
refinery, also in Rayagada to refine it for exports. The open-cast mine was 
scheduled to produce bauxite. The project, however, was resisted since its 
very inception by the local indigenous people residing in the area, which 
although led to massive delays in the operationalization, was unable to stop 
the project in the end. Commonly known as the Kashipur anti-bauxite 
movement, it has a long and violent story, and is one of the historic 
environmental justice movements of Odisha.  Kashipur Block in the 
Rayagada district has 412 revenue villages and 109 hamlets governed by 20 
Gram Panchayats (GPs) with a total area of 1,505.90 sq. km and a 
population of 1, 21,044 (as per the 2001 census), out of which 61% belong 
to Scheduled Tribes and 20% to Scheduled Castes (Naik 2012; Padel and 
Das 2010). 
The reason why the people resisted the project right from the beginning 
was their lack of confidence in the promises of employment, basic 
amenities and infrastructure and development, as NALCO had made 
similar promises in the early 1980s in the neighbouring regions for the 
creation of the biggest bauxite mine and refinery of the country. Opposition 
to the Kashipur bauxite mine was spearheaded by the Prakrutik Sampad 
Surakshya Parishad (PSSP) movement and several Adivasi-Dalit movement 
organizations in South Odisha in addition to various national and 
transnational solidarity groups, including actions against Norsk Hydro and 
the movement called ALCAN‘t of Montreal. PSSP had more than 1000 
members, many of them tribal, many of them women. 
These non-violent forms of protest systematically met with violent 
repercussions from the state — be it the police force, or the goons 
employed by the mining companies. The most memorable one is the police 
firing on adivasis on 16 December 2000 in Maikanch village of Kashipur 
block, killing three protestors (grassroots environmental defenders, as they 
would be called today), permanently disabling 6 and seriously injuring 30. 
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The people had put up a barricade on the road at Maikanch as part of their 
resistance against the alumina project. The day before the massacre, this 
barricade had prevented a delegation of political leaders from fraudulently 
representing the people in a ‗multi-stakeholder dialogue‘ organized by the 
company at Nuagaon village. UAIL and CARE International (a corporate-
funded NGO) had allegedly formed this ―all-party committee‖ by 
handpicking representatives of various pro-project electioneering parties. 
The people forced these pro-project leaders to return to Rayagada, the 
district headquarters. The people alleged that the firing was a consequence 
of this action (Das 2001; Sarangi et al. 2005). 
4.2. Structural and Cultural Violence 
The different types of violence very often complement each other. In many 
cases, however, due to the presence of direct violence, it is hard to 
understand the extent of structural or cultural violence exerted on the 
marginalized. The case of Kalinganagar (EJAtlas 2014) shows how direct 
violence, resulting in multiple deaths, together with structural violence, 
achieved the continuation of the project.   
Kalinganagar is located under Sukinda and Danagadi blocks of Jajpur 
district of Odisha. The place is located about 30-40 km from the district 
headquarters and about 100 kms from the state capital, Bhubaneswar. 
Government planned to convert the area into a 13,000-acre industrial 
centre. Factories located in the area would produce about 25 million tonnes 
of steel a year. Along with the steel factories, there would be an airport, a 
hospital, schools and new houses supplied with water and electricity. The 
Government of Odisha signed more than 40 MoUs with various private 
companies to set up the steel plants in the State. The Industrial 
Infrastructure Development Corporation of Orissa (IDCO) was 
responsible for developing the facilities for the proposed industrial 
complex. IDCO started acquiring land in the year 1992-94. Although 
IDCO had acquired the land in the early 90s, only a portion of it had been 
actually transferred to different industries and the remaining land was still in 
actual possession of people, who were cultivating it as before. 
The IDCO allegedly purchased land from people at a minimal rate while it 
sold the same land to the corporate beneficiary at much higher prices. Also, 
the compensation for land was given to only those who had patta on the 
land (legal document of ownership). This left a section of people 
uncompensated, as they had no patta over the land they possessed. Another 
section of people, who cultivated land as sharecroppers, didn‘t receive any 
compensation. After acquiring land from people, IDCO sold the land to 
different industries at a much higher price.  
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The name Kalinganagar became famous when on January 2, 2006, the State 
police opened fire on a protest by local Adivasi against the takeover and 
seizure of their land by a Tata Steel plant. As many as 16 people were killed, 
four more died in the hospital, besides a police constable was also killed in 
the clash. Despite this, Tata‘s projects for steel making in Kalinganagar 
went ahead, portraying a concoction of direct and structural violence 
(Pandey 2008). 
4.3. Slow Violence 
The concept of slow violence, popularized by Nixon (2011), can be 
understood as delayed destruction of nature and bodies. The Centre for 
Science and Environment has been using the concept of ‗slow murder‘ to 
explain the health effects of air pollution in Delhi, or the effect of using 
endosulfan in cashew plantations in Kerala (Narain 2017). 
It is important to know that just because a conflict encounters slow 
violence, doesn‘t mean that it foregoes direct or cultural ones. The case of 
the Sterlite copper smelting unit in Tuticorin, Tamil Nadu, spanning more 
than two decades can be taken as an example of this (EJAtlas 2018b). 
The Sterlite copper smelter plant had begun operations in 1996. Protests 
against the plant began almost immediately, with hundreds of fishermen 
blockading the port with their boats, in order to prevent the ships carrying 
copper ore from unloading in March and October of 1996. However, this 
did not stop the plant from operating. In July 1997, 165 women in a 
neighbouring factory—Ramesh Flowers, fainted as a result of a toxic gas 
leak from the plant. Some of these women later had miscarriages. Since 
then—over a period of more than two decades—villagers and local 
residents have been protesting against noxious sulphur dioxide leaks and 
bad effluent management. Since 1996, several complaints have been made 
to no avail.  
In March 2013, the ‗Anti-Sterlite People‘s Committee‘ started protesting 
following a gas leak incident on March 23, 2013, when many people from 
neighbourhood areas fell sick. It is common knowledge that the toxic 
sulphur dioxide gas is a by-product of smelting. After this incident, 5000 
people participated in the protest, a bandh (strike) was called and the town 
was shut down for several days in March 2013. 
Due to this, the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board issued a notice 
directing the Vedanta group company to close the plant. At the time, 
according to the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board, a sensor in the 
smelter‘s smokestack showed sulphur dioxide levels were more than double 
the permitted concentration, which resulted in a temporary shutdown of the 
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plant. However, the Supreme Court of India eventually permitted the plant 
to restart operations under the condition of a payment of INR 100 crore 
(~15 million USD at the time) to compensate for polluting the surrounding 
land and water sources since 1997 and for running the smelter without 
various environmental clearances for a few years. 
In September 2017, the National Green Tribunal found the Sterlite plant 
responsible for dumping copper slag in the Upper Odai river and causing 
the blockade of the river stream. The judgment also revealed that between 
2013 and 2017 the plant operated without authorisation under the 
Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling and Transboundary Movement) 
Rules, 2008, and ordered Vedanta-Sterlite Group to compensate the 
affected villagers for the pollution it had caused.  
Since then, aside from occasional resistance, it was not until the 
announcement for expansion of the plant that public anger revived 
strongly. The plant was set to increase the smelter‘s capacity from 400,000 
tons to 800,000 tons per year within the next 24 months. In corporate 
statements, Vedanta-Sterlite stated that this expansion would make the 
Tuticorin smelter, ―one of the world‘s largest single-location copper 
smelting complexes‖. Protests re-emerged with residents calling for an 
indefinite dharna (protest) and hunger strike on 12 February 2018. It was 
reported that in the beginning of February, villagers had petitioned the 
district collector several times seeking closure of the unit, but no action was 
taken, showing structural violence. The plant is located beside the fragile 
Gulf of Mannar, where toxic waste has damaged fish populations affecting 
the livelihood of thousands of fishermen. ―There are lot of environmental 
dangers as well as health dangers, particularly cancer. Almost every house is 
affected by cancer. Children are most affected. Throat cancer has increased. 
Eye cancer has also gone up‖, Fathima Babu, the convener of the Anti-
Sterlite People's Movement was reported as saying. 
Eventually, when top district officials failed to reach an understanding, 
around 250 people began an indefinite fast. Over 500 people, including 
many women and schoolchildren, blocked the company gates until they 
were rounded up and arrested on 14 February 2018. Since then, protests 
had been ongoing day and night, especially in the villages surrounding the 
plant which were the worst affected  
On 22 May 2018, the hundredth day of the peaceful protests, more than 
20,000 villagers marched to the collector‘s office demanding the closure of 
the plant. Police were not ready to take care of such a large number of 
people, and shot at the protestors, killing 13 of them.  Due to a lot of public 
and international pressure following this incident, when claims were made 
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on crony capitalism and industry-government collusion, the plant was 
finally ordered to be shut down. However, it is still not certain if this order 
will be carried out as the National Green Tribunal has termed the 
arguments for the closure of Sterlite plant as ―hyper technical‖ 
(Thirumurthy 2018).  
4.4. Ecological Violence 
The case of an industrial sacrifice zone, situated in the north of Chennai, 
bounded by the Korttalaiyar river, Ennore creek and Bay of Bengal can be 
seen as an example of ecological violence (EJAtlas 2017c). The case was the 
topic of a study by ecologist Nityanand Jayaraman that later was converted 
into an acclaimed Carnatic song by T.M. Krishna. The song explains that 
Ennore creek (with its mangroves and fishing grounds) was a true 
Poramboke, a ―commons‖, although the word Poramboke is now used in 
the sense of ―waste-land‖ or even ―waste-people‖.3 This industrial area has 
three operational state-owned coal thermal power plants, next to the 
Ennore Port from where the coal comes. The site hosts several other 
polluting chemical industries, including paint, fertilizers, cement and 
pharmaceutical, as well as a landfill. This case combines issues of coastal 
protection and enormous environmental damage by industry and utilities 
and can be considered as a case of ecological violence.  
Fisherfolks, environmentalists and citizens have complained against this 
ecological violence over the years. In recent years, fisherfolks lodged their 
protest against the industrial encroachment and pollution that has destroyed 
mangroves and adversely affected aquatic life affecting their livelihoods. 
The industries are expanding; apart from the three operating CFPP, another 
one has been cleared. Within 10km, there will be 6 000MW of coal plants. 
All have environmental clearances, but environmentalists argue that these 
documents mean little. Clearance by the NTECL (Tamil Nadu Energy 
Company Limited) has proclaimed that the ―Boundary for the proposed 
power project would be outside the CRZ [Coastal Regulation Zone]‖. But 
the plant boundary encloses mangroves. This industrial hell of fly ash and 
fumes is far from the eyes of the city dwellers who benefit from the 
electricity and the other products. Instead, the people living here (such as 
fishers and immigrant workers), despite bearing all costs, don't get any of 
the benefits. We report two examples. 
                                                          
3 The song, which is a cultural expression of environmental justice movement can be viewed 
in this link: https://video.scroll.in/826772/watch-tm-krishna-sings-to-arouse-people-into-
preventing-chennais-environmental-degradation 
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The workers who have at once been employed to construct one of the 
power plants, now live with their families in miserable huts right on one of 
toxic fly ash dump without any facilities (water, sewage or electricity) and 
are left to their destiny. The residents are all casual workers, many from 
Odisha and Jharkhand. Environmentalist Nityanand Jayaraman reports that 
one Odiya worker from Keonjhar said: ―We came here more than 15 years 
ago to build the power plant. We used to live there‖, he said pointing inside 
the plant:,―once it was built, we had to get out. Now we get by with odd 
jobs here and there‖. Sivanpadai Veethi Kuppam, an inland village of the 
fishing community, has been devastated by pollution, ill-health and 
dwindling catches. There are hardly any fish in the creek now, villagers 
report. Many species have disappeared. Those with boats sail to less 
polluted waters to fish. Others who use hand-cast nets walk along the banks 
all the way to the river mouth more than 8 km away, a full day's work with 
uncertain results. 
Years ago, this area was home to mangroves and fishing communities. 
Today, the whole site is highly contaminated. Fly ash from the thermal 
power plant is dumped in the nearby riverbank and wetlands. Recently, 
locals notice the encroachment of wetlands. There are signs such as ―This 
land belongs to NTECL‖ (Tamil Nadu Energy Company Ltd). Nityanand 
Jayaraman explains that these signs are a lie, as this was never land but 
water and wetlands. Until recently, this was a healthy marine ecosystem with 
life and livelihoods. Such sprawling wetlands are excellent flood mitigators. 
Their vast surface area allows them to swell and accommodate rain waters 
and tidal surges. Converting them into paved real estate will exacerbate 
flooding and deflect the impact of storm surges to less resilient areas. 
On 31 December 2015, The Hindu (Yamunan 2015) reported: ―Fishermen 
allege that mangroves have been destroyed at Athipattu owing to works 
undertaken by Kamarajar Port Trust‖. Fishermen in Ennore took to the 
streets protesting against the destruction of mangroves in the Athipattu area 
by a contractor engaged by Ennore Port (officially renamed Kamraj Port 
Limited, KPL). As severe floods had recently affected Chennai, the 
fishermen claimed that mangroves were crucial for limiting the damage 
during cyclones. Also, the vegetation breeds prawns, a major source of 
livelihood in the area. According to A. Venkatesh, president of 
Mukadhwarakuppam Kadal Meenavar Cooperative Union, a large area of 
mangrove vegetation was levelled by dumping rubbish. The activity was 
carried out on behalf of the Port.  
In late November 2015, the Port faced similar allegations when activists 
claimed dumping of spoils of dredging in 400 acres of hydrologically-
sensitive wetland area as part of the Port‘s development activities. In its 
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response, the KPL said it had purchased land to the extent of about 683 
acres adjoining the Ennore creek from the salt department. The letter stated 
that: ―... the dredged material has been dumped at low-level area at the 
south of North Chennai Thermal Power Station road where the land was 
purchased from the salt department. It is informed that filling is proposed 
in KPL land only and not in the waterbodies‖. 
It also assured the natural flow of the creek would not be disturbed. 
However, Mr. Venkatesh disputed the claim and said the very fact that 
mangroves have been levelled shows that a very sensitive area has been 
filled. He told The Hindu: ―This activity is also a violation of CRZ (Coastal 
Regulation Zone) notifications. Our community will scale up the protests if 
this does not stop immediately‖ (Yamunan 2015). The conflict goes 
unabated. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
India has the highest number of cases reported in the EJAtlas database. But 
few are considered as successes in environmental justice. Using the 
multidimensional approach for understanding violence, we can argue that 
violence is manifested in one way or the other in every single conflict. 
Ecological distribution conflicts follow often a pattern of brutality and 
violence, human rights violation, asymmetric power structures and illegal 
methods and intimidation tactics to coerce the ecosystem people into giving 
up their land, livelihood and often culture. It must be highlighted then, the 
tremendous effort by movements which continue to remain non-violent (as 
most in India are) under such exertions of violence at different levels. It 
doesn‘t come as a surprise then, that environmental justice movements are 
claimed to be forces of sustainability (Scheidel et al. 2018).   
Analyzing only a few cases, in the limited space of an academic journal 
article, has shown how different forms of violence overlap across and 
within conflicts. It  is coherent with the findings of Navas et al. (2018), 
which further discusses the different ways in which environmental 
defenders and communities resist violence against them, and conclude that 
‗the common understanding of violence in environmental conflicts as a 
direct event in time and space is only the tip of the iceberg and that 
violence can reach not only environmental defenders, but also 
communities, nature and the many species living in, and the sustainability of 
their relations‘. Violence has structural, cultural and ecological aspects. It is 
not only episodic, it is often slow and invisible for stretches of time.  
[89] Brototi Roy and Joan Martinez-Alier  
In Central America, the resistances are not just against specific 
environmental injustices, but also against the violence of patriarchy and 
coloniality. In India too these links are probably present in the tribal 
population‘s resistance against internal colonialism, and in the role of 
women in environmental movements. They are largely unmentioned in the 
present article, and garners further research, both in the Indian context and 
comparatively with other regions of the global South. Meanwhile the role of 
Dalits both as victims and agents of resistance in environmental conflicts is 
one facet of political ecology of India that does not appear in the same 
form elsewhere (Sharma 2018).  
The social metabolic processes are similar everywhere: the violence(s) and 
the resistance(s) are also similar (although India has a specific vocabulary of 
civil disobedience), as are the protagonists and the forms of mobilization of 
what we see as a global movement for environmental justice. What differs 
are the social, cultural and political specificities.  In this regard, a future 
agenda for academic-activist coproduced knowledge on political ecology 
(defined as the study of ecological distribution conflicts) should aim 
towards more comparative south-south collaboration to learn from other 
parts of the world going through the same struggles and protests, with the 
aim to co-create a socio-ecologically just and equal society.  
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